

Einleitung, Hauptteil und Schlussteil

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Was wir bisher gelernt haben

- Was ist Politikwissenschaft?
- Problemstellung/Puzzle
- Erkenntnisinteresse und Forschungsfrage(n)
- (Hypo)Thesen
- (Ebenen der) Argumentation
- topic sentence
- parallel construction
- Storyboard
- Outline

Lernziel für diese Einheit

Lernziele

- Aufgaben und Funktionen von Einleitung, Hauptteil und Schlussteil
- Mustereinleitungen
- Create a Research Space (CARS)
- Einleitungen als ein “Columbo-Krimi”
- Haupt- und Untertitel
- ein Abstract ersetzt keine Einleitung

Teile einer Arbeit

“First you tell them what you’re going to tell them; then you tell them; then you tell them what you told them.” (Reid 2010, 18)

Einleitung

“First you tell them what you’re going to tell them;”

Hauptteil

“then you tell them;”

Schlussteil

“then you tell them what you told them.”

Einleitung

Drei Ziele einer Einleitung nach Little (2016, 3)

- Einführung in Thema
- Forschungsstand
- eigener Ansatz und Ergebnisse

Elemente einer guten Einleitung

! Elemente einer guten Einleitung

1. Hinführung zum Thema;
2. kurzer literature review mit dem Aufzeigen der Forschungslücke;
3. Darlegung des Problems bzw. Puzzles;
4. Ableitung des Erkenntnisinteresses (inkl. der Forschungsfrage(n));
5. kurze Vorstellung des theoretischen Ansatzes und des Forschungsdesigns;
6. Präsentation der Ergebnisse (bzw. der (Makro)These(n)) und die Implikationen des Beitrags für Forschung und die reale Welt;
7. Vorgehensweise.

Tabelle 1: Muster einer Einleitung nach Little (2016)

| Muster | Elemente |
|----------|--|
| Muster 1 | (1) Beschreibung eines Phänomens |
| | (2) bestehende Forschung kann dieses Phänomen schlecht erklären |
| | (3) Beitrag versucht diese Forschungslücke zu schließen |
| Muster 2 | (1) Thema ist wichtig und bereits sehr gut erforscht |
| | (2) es gibt aber etwas, dem bisher zu wenig Augenmerk geschenkt wurde |
| | (3) Beitrag versucht diesen bisher unterforschten Aspekt zu beleuchten |
| Muster 3 | (1) Debatte zu einem Thema ist widersprüchlich |
| | (2) Beitrag versucht durch eine neue Fallstudie bzw. eine neue Argumentation entweder eine Seite in der Debatte zu stützen oder den Widerspruch aufzulösen |

Beispiel einer guten Einleitung

Ilai Z. Saltzman (2012). “Softbalancing as Foreign Policy: Assessing American Strategy toward Japan in the Interwar Period”.

In recent years, we have witnessed a heated debate concerning the place and the actual legitimacy of soft balancing in International Relations (IR) scholarship. Critics point out that soft balancing is methodologically degenerative and that it is merely an ad-hoc explanation rather than a coherent theoretical concept. Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, for example, contend that “the soft-balancing argument has no traction. The only reason some analysts have concluded otherwise is because they have failed to consider alternative explanations.” They conclude that “[T]here is no empirical basis for the soft-balancing argument, and hence, any effort to invoke it as a means of buttressing balance of power theory is fruitless” (Brooks and Wohlforth 2005:106, 107). Similarly, Keir Lieber and Gerard Alexander argued that soft balancing resembles ordinary interstate diplomacy, that its predictions are vague and lack empirical support, and that the term is too elusive to be defined. On this basis, they declare that “any discussion of soft balancing is much ado about nothing” (Lieber and Alexander 2005:109).

On the other hand, proponents of this concept insist that soft balancing is crucial for the understanding of contemporary balancing behavior vis-à-vis the United States. One scholar has claimed that “in the post-Cold War era, soft balancing has become an attractive strategy through which second-tier major powers are able to challenge the legitimacy of the interventionist policies of the United States and its allies both internationally and in US domestic public opinion” (Paul 2005:59). Moreover, soft balancing has been said to “replac[e] traditional hard balancing as the principal reaction of major powers to the Bush administration’s preventive war doctrine” (Pape 2005:38).

Despite the fact that recent studies significantly advanced our understanding of what constitutes soft balancing, two key elements are still missing from the related literature. First, we still lack an accepted definition of the concept that is further differentiated from balance of power theory and its underlying logic. Kai He and Huiyun Feng, for example, contend that “soft balancing refers to the efforts to undermine the relative power of the threatening state through diplomatic coordination and institutional constraints” (He and Feng 2007:393). But while they acknowledge the distinct use of nonmilitary means as part of a soft-balancing strategy, their definition remains heavily reliant on balance of power theory’s logic, hence making the former a nuance of the latter instead of making it an alternative.

Second, previous studies provided an unsatisfactory analysis of soft-balancing patterns prior to the post-Cold War era or soft-balancing practices employed against powers other than the United States, elements that could confirm that the term is historically valid rather than an ad-hoc explanation as its critics maintain.¹ Robert Pape, to cite just one example, mentioned Bismarck's anti-British web of alliances and commitments following the Franco-Prussian War alongside American containment policy of the Soviet Union in the early stages of the Cold War, but devoted only two paragraphs to both cases (Pape 2005:37–38).

Consequently, this article's major objective is twofold: (i) to separate soft balancing from balance of power theory in order to enhance its conceptual standing; and (ii) to apply the "soft-balancing proposition" to a pre-Cold War historical case in order to show that it is a distinct foreign policy strategy. From this analysis, it becomes clear that soft balancing is not only a legitimate conceptual term, but also that it should not be limited to describe global reactions to American preeminence in the post-Cold War era.


This article is laid out in five sections. The first defines soft balancing and contrasts it with balance of power theory. The second explains the selection of the case from a theoretical and methodological perspective. The third and fourth sections illustrate the Roosevelt Administration's soft-balancing foreign policy strategy vis-à-vis Japan from the Manchurian Incident to Pearl Harbor. And the final part presents some general conclusions and suggestions for further research.

Hauptteil

⚠ Kapitel des Hauptteils nach Powner (2015, 207)

1. einem ausführlichen literature review;
2. dem theoretischen Teil;
3. die umfangreiche Darlegung des Forschungsdesign;
4. die Analyse und Diskussion der Ergebnisse der Arbeit.

Schlussteil



Titel

Anforderungen an einen Titel

- Neugierde/Interesse
- Maximum an Informationen, Minimum an Wörtern

**Taking Preferences Seriously:
A Liberal Theory of
International Politics**
Andrew Moravcsik

Abbildung 1: Moravcsik (1997)

International Studies Quarterly (2003) 47, 371–393

***Causes of Peace: Democracy,
Interdependence, and International
Organizations, 1885–1992***

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BRUCE RUSSETT

Yale University

MICHAEL L. BERBAUM

University of Illinois at Chicago

Abbildung 2: Oneal, Russett, und Berbaum (2003)

Abstract

! Elemente eines guten Abstracts nach Powner (2015, 208)

1. Erkenntnisinteresse/Forschungsfrage;
2. wissenschaftlicher Kontext/Thema/Forschungslücke;
3. Makrothese;
4. Forschungsdesign;
5. Ergebnisse;
6. Relevanz des Beitrages für die Forschung.

Beispiel eines guten Abstracts

Michael E. Flynn (2014). “Military Leadership, Institutional Change, and Priorities in Military Spending”.

How does political competition among domestic actors influence foreign policy choice? Studies examining these questions often focus on the role of economic or partisan interests, and how they influence the preferences of decision makers who are subject to electoral institutions and pressures of their constituents. Less attention has been paid to how the preferences of other influential but unelected actors influence state behavior. Results indicate that military leaders occupying key positions can influence defense spending priorities in favor of their respective branches. Results also suggest the influence of military leaders has changed and is conditional upon the institutions governing the relationships between civilian decision makers and military leaders.

Literatur

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